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## “[...] ASSUMING THAT EVERY PHILOSOPHY WAS ORIGINALLY A LONG TRAGEDY”: OR ON THE EDGE BETWEEN INTERPRETATION AND TRUTH<sup>1,2</sup>

Eder David de Freitas Melo<sup>3</sup>

*Can an ass be tragic? To perish under a burden one can  
neither bear nor throw off? The case  
of the philosopher.*

Nietzsche, CI, Maxims and Arrows, §11

### Abstract

Nietzsche, at the end of paragraph 25 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, suggests that “every philosophy was originally a long tragedy”. This paper proposes a particular interpretation for this assertion, in which the tragic sense attributed to philosophy is associated with the philosophical quest for truth that Nietzsche names as “will to truth”. In this respect, the conceptual rudder is both the notion of “will to power”, here understood as an intrinsically agonistic and interpretive process, constitutor of meaning and domain, and the relation of this notion with two other concepts that are essential to the idea of tragedy, namely, *hybris* and prudence.

**Keywords:** Will to Power; Will to Truth; Philosophy; Interpretation; Tragedy.

### “[...] PRESSUPONDO QUE TODA FILOSOFIA TENHA SIDO, NA SUA GÊNESE, UMA LONGA TRAGÉDIA”: OU NO LIMITE ENTRE INTERPRETAÇÃO E VERDADE

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## Resumo

Nietzsche, no final do §25 de *Além do bem e do mal*, avança que *toda filosofia foi, em seu surgimento, uma longa tragédia*. Neste texto proponho uma interpretação para essa afirmação na qual o sentido trágico atribuído à filosofia está ligado à busca dos filósofos pela verdade, a qual é caracterizada por Nietzsche como vontade de verdade. Para tanto, o norte conceitual será a noção de vontade de poder entendida como processo intrinsecamente agonístico-interpretativo, constituidor de sentido e domínio, e a relação dessa noção com outras duas caras à concepção de tragédia que veremos aqui, quais sejam: *hybris* e prudência.

**Palavras-chave:** Vontade de Poder; Vontade de Verdade; Filosofia; Interpretação; Tragédia.

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, §25, Nietzsche warns the most serious thinkers, the philosophers, with quite severe words: “beware of martyrdom! Of suffering ‘for the sake of truth!’”. However, should they fail to follow his advice, and the martyrdom of the philosophers do occur, Nietzsche argues that it would become clear what this sacrifice really meant: “— only a satyr play, only a satirical epilogue, only the continuing proof that the long, real tragedy *has come to an end* (assuming that every philosophy was originally a long tragedy —)” (2002, p. 27).

We often see philosophy being associated with tragedy, especially when the former discusses or makes use of the latter. In this sense, for instance, there are several theories of tragedy and a number of ethical studies which at times approach or distance themselves from any of the intuitions related to the plots of Greek tragedies. Nevertheless, it seems peculiar to assume that every philosophy was in the *beginning* a lasting *tragedy* and associate it with the philosopher’s martyrdom for the *truth*.

Even though considering philosophy as a tragedy resembles more like a thesis or a conclusion of an argument than an assumption, it does not preclude that proposition from being used *qua* premise, like a necessary condition within

an argumentative sequence. However, in order for both possibilities to be valid, i.e., to be possible to interpret that statement both as an assumption and as a conclusion of an argument, it would be necessary a certain imbrication between philosophy and tragedy. Thus, an articulation between them would be outlined, or perhaps something even stronger, such as a similarity, which enables this dual use (assumption and thesis). However, it is important to underline that this would not occur in the same argumentative sequence because if that occurred, it would characterize a petition of principle. It is important to note and question whether Nietzsche really assumes “that every philosophy was originally a long tragedy” or, as I argue here, if this is a thesis he uses at the end of the aphorism as an assumption. For this interpretation, at least a third sign might be needed to establish a connection between tragedy and philosophy, showing the “under bridge” implicit in BGE 25. In other words, assuming that between philosophy and tragedy there is no tautological relation, the following question arises: through which sign becomes possible to draw an analogy between them within Nietzsche’s philosophy? My preliminary hypothesis is that the notion of truth derived from will to power works as a mediator between philosophy and tragedy when the former is qualified as the latter.

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The theme of truth and of its relationship with philosophy is not a sole occurrence in *Beyond Good and Evil*. Already in the first lines of the Prologue, there is an approach between the insistent quest for truth and a terrible seriousness, a sad dogmatism as perennial features in the history of philosophy. For instance, philosophy and science are the thematic axis of Part 1, entitled “On the prejudices of philosophers”. This chapter analyzes these disciplines of human

knowledge according to the feature that perhaps most unites them: the quest and will to understand reality, ultimately, the possession of truth. Nietzsche puts in question this aspect, producing a tension in the spirit like a taut bow: one end of the arc would be the dogmatic philosophy whose only aim is "truth," the other end would be his own philosophy, as a philosophizing, among other things, of the value "of truth".

In the first aphorism of *Beyond Good and Evil*, the long and relentless quest of philosophy for truth is characterized as will to truth, as that which aspires to truth. This will is the impetus toward truth, the drive toward truth as a desire for appropriation, science, enlightenment, and understanding. But already there it can be questioned: what, then, is the truth for the will that searches for it? Does setting oneself in motion toward truth entails the assumption that there exists something that is "the truth"?

What turns itself toward truth, like an active affect and a desire for appropriation, is the will; and the will is, fundamentally, will to power, a relation among drives, like the most basic reality to which we can reach out, where each drive turns into a will, like a desire for more power (Cf. NIETZSCHE, 2002, p. 35-36)<sup>4</sup>. A drive cannot be disconnected from its acting, from the exercising its own potency in the midst of others and over others. As a permanent movement, eagerness, it is constantly exercising power, searching for power. Will is nothing less than will to power<sup>5</sup>. And power (strength) is not something that neglects its potency, its capacity to overcome the others; on the contrary, this is precisely what defines it. "A *quantum* of force is just such a quantum of drive, will, action,

<sup>4</sup> I will mention in footnotes the usual way of quoting Nietzsche's writings by researchers, i.e., first the initials of the book's title and after the number of section or aphorism. In this case: BGE, §36.

<sup>5</sup> That is how we interpret the following statement: "'Will' and 'power' presuppose and imply each other. 'Will to power' is one word" (AYDIN, 2007, p. 28).

in fact, it is nothing but this driving, willing and acting" (NIETZSCHE, 2006, p. 26)<sup>6</sup>.

As whole activity, and always amongst others – since it is not possible to conceive any drive acting in isolation as an unconditioned unity, on the contrary, it always acts upon other drives – the will to power is intrinsically agonistic<sup>7</sup>. This feature, in which "wills act upon other wills, as wills to power" (TONGEREN, 2012, p. 222)<sup>8</sup>, within the "theory of will to power operating in every happening", allows the conclusion that "everything that occurs [...] consists of overpowering, dominating, and in their turn, overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation" (NIETZSCHE, 2006, p. 51)<sup>9</sup>.

Thus, all reality is understood according to a basic quality, that is will to power. Nietzsche writes in the posthumous fragment 7 [54] from the end of 1886 / Spring of 1887: "To regard what all life shows as a repetition in miniature of the total tendency: hence a new definition of the concept 'life', as will to power" (NIETZSCHE, 2003, p. 138). Along the same lines, but now in a published work, he says: every development, every chain of happenings, every process, "always appearing, as it does, in the form of the will and way to greater power; [... as] the essence of life, its *will to power*" (NIETZSCHE, 2006, p. 52)<sup>10</sup>.

In Nietzsche's will to power theory, there is a double hermeneutic aspect. On one hand, according to this philosopher, the quality of will to power is something perceived from reality itself, something that "appears" in every happening, what "life shows", that is, to recognize the wills to power as the

<sup>6</sup> GM, I, §13.

<sup>7</sup> In a materialistic context, it seems feasible to think of a material unity, for instance, an atom in isolation (perhaps, in a *vacuum*). On the other hand, the same does not occur with the theory of will to power for it is impossible to conceive a strength, a drive, or a will in solipsism, since it is not disconnected from its acting, from its exercising of power; on the contrary, it is exactly this action, it is whole activity. For this, at least one other strength or will is needed, so that one can exercise its *quantum* of power over the other.

<sup>8</sup> Brandão's translation.

<sup>9</sup> GM, II, §12.

<sup>10</sup> Ibidem.

reality from its own efficaciousness is an interpretation of the world based on what the world itself presents. For Nietzsche, the notion of will to power is the primary and most basic feature that we can apprehend from effectiveness, however, without acquiring a status superior to interpretation. As he writes in §36 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, “The world seen from inside, the world determined and described with respect to its ‘intelligible character’ – would be just this ‘will to power’ and nothing else. –” (p. 36). It is not about absolute truth, of “the truth”, but solely of a hermeneutics of the world in the interior of life in accordance with what is intelligible for man.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, the acting itself of the will to power is interpretation. According to Müller-Lauter, “a will to power seeks, for instance, to subdue another will to power. To the subjugation belongs a manner – specific each time – of “knowing” that which must be subdued. No will to power is a ‘blind will’.” (1997, p. 115)<sup>12</sup>.

There is a sensibility of the self and the other in each will: the self is the own will that identifies itself with a kind of unity turned toward the subjugation of the other, in this case, of another will to power. In this agonistic relationship, it can be said that there is a yearning, like a searching affection, a desire for making use of the other; but this implies feeling, perceiving the presence of the other, and also thinking, recognizing, devising means, and strategies to subdue the other. This process takes shape of a power center, a unity understood as will to power that when overpowering, interprets, or like an impulse that, when dominating, imprints meaning. Since all this is a sole activity from the viewpoint of the dominant will to power, Nietzsche states in the prologue of *Beyond Good and Evil* that it is “the perspective, the basic condition of all life”, since the overpowering,

<sup>11</sup> For a productive deepening and problematization of the main issues surrounding the philosophical status of the will to power theory as a Nietzschean interpretation of reality, and of a possible truth-value of this theory, see Müller-Lauter, 1997, p. 142-152; and also see Tongeren, 2012, p. 235-252.

<sup>12</sup> Brandão’s translation.

appropriating, or dominating, is itself interpretation, configuration of meaning, conformation of a perspective.

This second hermeneutic aspect is a characterization of the perspective as scope and limit of semantic processes. In line with this, I want to suggest that when acting upon other wills to power, an agonistic and interpretative process, the dominant will gives meaning to itself by imprinting meaning on another, or rather, that the meaning forced upon a weaker will to power is a meaning derived from the dominant will. Or yet, it can be understood that it is the very meaning of the dominant will that, by recognizing itself as such, absorbs the senses of weaker wills and inserts them into an economy of the whole.

If the will to power is will to more power, the interpretation is the concrete operation of the acquisition of domain over things. In its longing for growth, the will to power limits, establishes degrees, differences of power that feel themselves as such, by virtue of the confrontation, that is, measures the other wills which also want more power based on the sentiment of their own value [...]. Thus, not only the will to power makes reference to a dynamic struggle of powers, but it also inextricably makes reference to the internal organization of these forces by an assessment and interpretation as incorporation. (MECA, 2015, p. 107)<sup>13</sup>.

Nietzsche’s theory of will to power is a conceptual arrangement that is essentially agonistic and perspectivistic, a primacy for the combat and for the interpretation, or rather for the dispute of interpretations as a mechanism of self-constitution. In case we make an attempt at a synthesis between these two hermeneutical aspects of will to power (the world interpreted as will to power and the perspectivism as intrinsic action to each will), it becomes possible to glimpse that “where the will to power is mentioned, it is this same will to power that is already properly in work” (TONGEREN, 2012, p. 252)<sup>14</sup>. This occurs because

<sup>13</sup> Brandão’s translation.

<sup>14</sup> Idem.

it is not possible a meta-observation or a supra-perspective about the combat at the same time retrieved from it, in a neutral position, supra-sensitive, beyond effectiveness. If this were possible, the observer would have to be an entity foreign to reality, to life as we conceive it.<sup>15</sup> Since this is not the case of the philosophers, when each one of them performs their conceptual arrangement, it is the will to power itself that imprints meaning there, interprets, and exhales power. And of course, this also applies to Nietzsche's philosophy, as a "systematic" philosophy of will to power that recognizes itself as such.<sup>16</sup>

For this reason, the "truth" that is sought by the will is, for Nietzsche, the configuration of the own perspective of this will, as a sign of domain, basic operations of wills which are always in "process of achieving greater power". It is not an *ens realissimum*, as ultimate reality understood as absolute truth grasped by rationality. One must not mistake an image and world disposition for a factual reality, a text, an explication; what does exist is solely interpretation (NIETZSCHE, 2002, p. 22-23)<sup>17</sup>. In case a philosophy, when understood as an expression of a dominant will to power, begins to believe in itself as the bearer and advocate of the standard of "the truth", while only valid conceptualization about the effectiveness, it then commits *hybris*. It would assume to have something that is beyond its limits, or rather, that it cannot even effectively demonstrate the existence. Understanding what cannot be grasped, or being aware of something that does not exist, harmonizes with the two main meanings of *hybris*:

<sup>15</sup> Cf., e.g., Nietzsche, 2006c, p. 162-163 [TI, The Problem of Socrates, §2]: "You really have to stretch out your fingers and make a concerted attempt to grasp this amazing piece of subtlety, that the value of life cannot be estimated. Not by the living, who are an interested party, a bone of contention, even, and not judges". Cf., also Viesenteiner, 2012; and also Tongeren, Op. Cit., p. 211-252.

<sup>16</sup> Philosophy "always creates the world in its own image, it cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the 'creation of the world,' to the *causa prima* [first cause]." (NIETZSCHE, 2002, p. 11 [BGE, §9]).

<sup>17</sup> BGE, §22.

immoderation and blindness – the former is the senseless attempt to extrapolate the extent of its own resources, the latter is the price paid for imprudently looking at distances so far away that it does not perceive what happens in its surroundings, nor does it reach anywhere in order to repose.

In opposition to the *hybris*, the common thread of prudence for the Greeks was "the idea of an intellectual act or function [...] frequently associated to the notion of *limit*, initially understood in a negative sense", that is, what prevents someone from going ahead or do something, like a kind of frontier, and "subsequently, positive, of *equilibrium*", of the good measure that both preserves and cooperates in the construction of a beautiful life (AUBENQUE, 2003, p. 249)<sup>18</sup>. In the Attic tragedies, this content of Greek popular wisdom unfolded in drama,<sup>19</sup> which as a representation of tensions intrinsic to human life, warns us to do

the best at every step, worry about the predictable consequences, but leave the unpredictable to the gods; to suspect "big words" that are not only empty but treacherous, when it is intended to apply them without mediations to human reality that perhaps is not bound to give in; not to rival the gods in the custody of a superhuman wisdom, that quickly reveals itself as inhuman when it intends to impose conclusions to mankind. (AUBENQUE, 2003, p. 260-262)<sup>20</sup>.

On the contrary and in dispute with this tragic conception, philosophy seems to have almost always been devoted to the rivalry with the gods, in other words, the enterprise of a systematic and self-consistent rationality as a method

<sup>18</sup> Brandão's translation.

<sup>19</sup> The specificities of life experiences of a people remain inscribed on their sacred symbols, in their language and their art (Cf. KERÉNYI, 2002, p. XXII). In *The Birth of Tragedy*, it can be inferred that for Nietzsche the Greek tragedy is a transfiguration in art elements of popular wisdom from that people. The mythical and religious foundation as well as the posture of life associated with it does not go unnoticed by this philosopher (Cf. SILK; STERN, 1983, p. 235).

<sup>20</sup> Brandão's translation.

capable of achieving an absolute knowledge and bestow man the long-awaited self-sufficiency. Both features, absolute knowledge and self-sufficiency, are normally capacities conferred to the gods and not to men, drawing a distance and a contradiction between ones and others.<sup>21</sup> The type of knowledge forged by metaphysics, the knowledge of absolute objects classified in a "dichotomous taxonomy" (good and evil, right and wrong, true knowledge and error, etc.) is, according to Martha Nussbaum, a "consistency in conflict that is bought at the price of self-deception" (NUSSBAUM, 1986, p. 39), like a precise calculation of contingencies in an endless universe of possibilities. Something more prudent than this intellectualism, this will to truth at any cost, would be to acknowledge the perspective (the judgment) as substitutes for "a science impossible to find", for if "there were people with this science, we would have to bend down before them" (AUBENQUE, 2003, p. 259)<sup>22</sup>.

The "limits of philosophy are only limits of man and, above all, of the world in which we live" (AUBENQUE, 2003, p. 275)<sup>23</sup>. It is considered lack of prudence not to observe the limits that are intrinsic to us; to reach up beyond our own possibilities is to know little of ourselves. On the other hand, it is cowardice or worthlessness to protect oneself in the unproductive and foiled security of isolation of the home and inaction, as abstention to tread any path for fear of what fortune may bring, or even, for fear of not getting anywhere in life. There is a tension between the laxness of mere contenting oneself with the own condition and the overcoming of oneself as excessiveness, *hybris*.

"The tragedies characteristically show a struggle between the ambition to transcend the merely human and a recognition of the losses entailed by this

<sup>21</sup> See Nietzsche, 1999, p. 46-51 [BT, §9]; See also Nussbaum, 1986 and Aubenque, 2003, p. 269-281.

<sup>22</sup> Brandão's translation.

<sup>23</sup> Idem.

ambition" (NUSSBAUM, 1986, p. 8). When examining the misadventures of Oedipus and Prometheus, Nietzsche argues that the individual who aspires to the Titanic necessarily commits sacrilege, which in no way is well regarded by the gods. For this reason, the tragic hero suffers the fate of his impiety as misadventure and disintegration. On the other hand, the hero's image is not without its luster and highlight, since despite his terrible fate, somehow his image and his deeds make him immortal. The fact that it is something within the human measure does not mean that it is not a reason for divine jealousy since that man puts himself up a little closer to the gods to rise himself as a hero a bit above the ordinary men.<sup>24</sup>

It must be noted that the outcome of the tragedy is not death or the end of it, but rather the hero who practiced *hybris*. The tragic death results from the end of combat, of internal tension, as Nietzsche argues in §11 of *The Birth of Tragedy*. It is the tension between what is merely human and the divine that gives birth to the tragedy, it is what fills the drama, and causes it to remain alive despite the hero's fortune. If his sufferings are intense, also is his image. If his actions express a conflict inherent to the *physis*, the tragedy is the dramatic staging of that conflict without solving it, which would be an oversimplification, or the most intense of excess, for it would intent to resolve a conflict that man is, perhaps, only capable of describing it (Cf. NUSSBAUM, 1986, p. 30-50).

Indeed, the popular Greek wisdom seems to dramatize in the tragedy both the luster of the hero and his setbacks, in which "seems to consist in being keenly responsive to the limits of one's 'material' and figuring out what is best given the possibilities, rather than rigidly aiming at some inflexible set of norms" (NUSSBAUM, 1986, p. 333). Be them the ethical norms for the agent, or the truth as a standard for human knowledge, the inflexibility of conduct or a point of view

<sup>24</sup> Cf., e.g., Nietzsche, 1999, §4, §9 e §25.

tends to collapse as soon as they are confronted with something more powerful than themselves. Both the ethical normalizations for the agent and the truth as a norm for human knowledge, the inflexibility of a conduct, or a viewpoint, tends to collapse as soon as they are confronted with something more potent than themselves. Thus, the tragic exception for the hero's misfortune is not a eulogy to loose complacency with the merely human and ordinary, but rather the perception that the distance between the commendable distinctiveness and the lavishness in the quest for this same distinctiveness is something rather subtle. For this reason, in order to be great and worthy of admiration, one must be as much as possible prudent when seeking to stand out without losing sight of the timing opportunity and materials available, but knowing that nothing is indefinitely certain and inflexible. He must also know that it does not matter how excellent a person is, such distinctiveness will never be a permanent and eternally valid safeguard capable of always protecting someone against the uncertain reversals of fortune.

This description of the human condition is not something bad in itself. It is rather an element of wisdom digging out from reality the possibilities of a good life, since if "certain central human values are available and valuable only within a context of risk and material limitation," and if "the very same evaluative choices that enhance the quality and completeness of a human life [...] open the agent to certain risks of disaster" (NUSSBAUM, 1986, p. 340-341), "the good makes its appearance only within the confines of what some creature is" (NUSSBAUM, 1986, p. 342). For this reason, the fragility and the needs of human beings are constitutive of the beauty and the distinction that are possible to them.

In line with this notion, Pierre Aubenque writes:

If all was clear, there would be nothing to do, and it remains to be done what cannot be known. However, you would not do anything if did not

"[...] ASSUMING THAT EVERY PHILOSOPHY WAS ORIGINALLY A LONG TRAGEDY"  
: OR ON THE EDGE BETWEEN INTERPRETATION AND TRUTH

know, somehow, what must be done. Halfway of an absolute knowledge [...] and of a chaotic perception [...], *prudence* [...] represents the possibility and the risk of human action. It is the first and last word [...] which invites man to wish for everything that is possible, but only the possible, and to leave the rest to the gods (2003, p. 281)<sup>25</sup>.

Prudence in acting, as understood by Nussbaum and Aubenque, must not be mistaken for a dichotomous taxonomy, as Nussbaum puts it, which opposes theory and praxis. With this I want to emphasize that by investigating this notion among the Greeks contemporary to the Attic tragedies, they realized that prudence concerned both the way of life of generals and warriors as well as of the wise men, that both addressing the *agora* and composing tragedies were considered to be something active and, therefore, in need of practical wisdom.

Now, considering this distinction, we realize that Nietzsche's philosophy, through the doctrine of will to power, seems to propose a type of knowing that is neither an absolute knowledge of the first causes and of the ultimate things nor a pressing skepticism before a chaotic contemplation of effectiveness. It is rather a kind of reasoning about the reality that at times interprets a process giving it a name, at times intervenes in this same process actively giving it a meaning, what at no time is mistaken for discovering or understanding something that was already fixed and determined in itself.

This prudence of Nietzschean philosophy excavates in the world the new possibilities and the limits of human intellection without being confused with a triumphant rationalism. On the other hand, it is not confused with pusillanimity either, with a lack of commitment or with conformism to what is given. A constant in Nietzsche's writings is that man is an incomplete being to whom it is

<sup>25</sup> Brandão's translation.

possible (and desirable) to overcome himself.<sup>26</sup> The tension between the making of philosophy within the possibilities of the human and beyond the merely human is an image of the very act of will to power, which is at the same time limited in its own potency and, moreover, an overflow of the same potency as an agonistic and interpretative process of acquiring power.

The agonism present in the becoming (understood as ongoing processes of wills to power) and in the conceptual framework of the will to power theory (as a philosophy on the intelligible character of the world operated by a specific will to power) creates a tension between a hermeneutic of reality and the construction of meaning as an establishment of the perspective of a will. While one is a judgment about effectiveness, the other is the effectiveness of a judgment itself. At the end, they become a combination, or an amalgamation between Hermes and Eris, an agreement in disagreement, a hermeneutic of the conflict in the conflict.

For the philosophy known as similar to the tragedy, the guidon of “truth” does not apply since it is the image of conflict dissolution. In case the agonistic aspect was dissolved, it would represent the death of tragedy in philosophy. In accordance with the will to power theory, as a conflict is not something that can be ultimately resolved, the one who torments himself with the truth is just like the fool who seeks to subdue the gods, the one who commits *hybris* and cannot reach excellence. For this reason, Nietzsche qualifies this sacrifice as a satirical comedy, an ultimate farce: it is comical and false, a lifeless image of tragedy, the misadventures of a “knower” blinded by the light of “enlightenment” to struggle

<sup>26</sup> Cf. e.g., Chapter 1 from *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life* (NIETZSCHE, 1997, p. 60-67); the section *On Self-Overcoming* from Second Part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (NIETZSCHE, 2006b, p. 88-90); and section 13 from First Essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality* (NIETZSCHE, 2006a, p. 25-27); and also Giacoia Junior, 2013, p. 21-59.

for an imaginary being, dreaming of the final victory over the darkness of the unknown. This is not the case of the heroic glow from the one who by overcoming the merely human becomes a little closer to the gods, at least as much as possible, putting his excellence in the opening between the risk of misadventure and commendable distinction.

Now, for what reason Nietzsche writes that “every philosophy” and not only some philosophies were in their origin “a long tragedy”? Firstly, because every philosophy is a given will to power conquering domain by imposing its own perspective, which, despite its own drive, does not free it of conflict with other wills. Secondly, because every philosophy is an enterprise seeking some truth (be it understood as an object in itself or as a configuration of a perspective), and for this very reason would be on the edge between blind excessiveness and fruitful distinction. Thirdly, because during “the time in which philosophy is effectively prodigious, it carries this divergence full of tension in itself – that in the end, becomes something proper to tragedy” (TONGEREN, 2012, p. 250)<sup>27</sup>.

Finally, Nietzsche affirms that this occurs in the *origin* of every philosophy. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche forges a tension – according to him, like a taut bow – with the whole history of philosophy previous to his own, which he describes as dogmatic since it has faithfully adhered itself to the truth. This tension in the interior of philosophy itself allows that the whole history of this discipline may be seen as one and the same history, the narrative of the most spiritual will to power, that creates worlds after its own image and searches for the *causa prima* when configuring meaning (Cf. NIETZSCHE, 2002, p. 10-11)<sup>28</sup>. If it

<sup>27</sup> Brandão's translation.

<sup>28</sup> BGE, §9.



happened only at the origin of every philosophy, one could add: “That is already a long story – and yet it seems to have hardly begun?” (NIETZSCHE, 2002, p. 5)<sup>29</sup>.

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<sup>29</sup> Ibidem, §1.