Proper names and identity in Frege and Kripke

Abstract

In this paper, I present the formulations and answers to Identity’s Problem between names developed by Gottlob Frege and Saul Kripke. The Identity’s Problem between proper names happens in sentences of identity, which involve two (different) proper names. The scope of the question was commonly reduced to two types of sentences: (i) a=a e (ii) a=b. I initially explain the cognitive value difference of the two types of sentences. Two philosophers stand out in the approach to the question, namely, Frege and Kripke. Frege was one of the first to address the Identity’s Sentences Problem between proper names and he introduced the notion of sense as the basis for an answer. Kripke by his turn presented a critique of Frege's theory of names and an alternative answer to the Identity’s Problem between names. Initially, I present the formulation and answer of Frege to the Identity’s Problem. After that, I present Kripke’s criticism to Frege’s theory. Finally, I present the formulation and answer to the Identity’s Problem developed by
Kripke.