The notion of 'substance' in Wittgenstein

Abstract

In this paper I analyze to what extent in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus his departure from the Aristotelian tradition with regard to ontology is already present. In subsequent writings, his criticism to the Aristotelian notion of ‘substance’ is explicit. The same does not happen in the Tractatus and there are numerous discussions about possible influences of Aristotelian ontology in the tractarian ontology. I will examine the concept of substance in earliest Wittgenstein’s writings, aiming to show that he does not accept the Aristotelian idea of ontology of objects. I argue that Wittgenstein’s refusal becomes explicit by his rejection to the usage of identity symbol in his logic of language. The Aristotelian and Wittgensteinian notions of substance will be analyzed from the point of view of their possible ontological nature in the world.