The fundamental project of the for-itself

An analysis of a possible conscious being (in-itself-for-itself) in Sartre’s thought

Authors

Keywords:

Sartre, In-itself, For-itself, Consciousness, Freedom

Abstract

In this article we will examine, in Sartre, the imminent need the for-itself has to be based near his conscience. The question by questioning the fundamental design of the for-itself will allow the analysis of human reality as a conscious being, free and marked by the anguish of freedom. So how is it possible and to what extent could a basis for human reality be found? Sartre’s philosophy reveals the human reality as being characterized from the for-itself. Following this proposal, the article will illustrate, first, the discovery of being in-itself, i.e., that being opaque and closed in on itself, the one who possesses the self from itself and that distances itself from the possibilities, being marked by being exactly what it is; the in-itself is what is, or arguably contingent. On the other hand, there is the for-itself, the being who pretends to be in-itself, to conduct themselves as a definite being, overcoming the initial contingency of the in-itself, but keeping for-itself. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that human reality becomes quite marked by the freedom life sentence, since it opened to the latent possibilities as a project to be played in the world, a being who is not content to be what is not and not to be what it is, a being who constantly seeks the reasons for its being and resilience of its latent contingency. Thus, it is essential to highlight that, according to Sartre, the for-itself seeks to justify itself and be realized as a conscious thing, that is, a being in-itself-for-itself. However, when faced with the gratuity of its existence, the for-itself will be transported to an incessant need to live with himself. Thus, the for-itself discovers the trouble, what will make them live in the
shadow of their freedom and their choices.

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References

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Published

2013-02-06

How to Cite

DE OLIVEIRA LIMA, Polyelton. The fundamental project of the for-itself: An analysis of a possible conscious being (in-itself-for-itself) in Sartre’s thought. Inquietude, Goiânia, v. 3, n. 2, p. 109–21, 2013. Disponível em: https://revistainquietude.com.br/index.php/inquietude/article/view/275. Acesso em: 26 sep. 2026.

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Artigos