The ontological basis of the Critique of pure reason and the postulates of Beweisgrund

A comparison

Abstract

Given the importance of the existential predicate, not only for the Kantian’s work, but for all modern ontology, this paper aims realize a contrast of the notion of existence/being in the Kantian philosophy. In a specific way, it aims to see how the notion in the Critique of pure reason (1781) is present, in some way, in a pre-critical Kantian work, dated from 1763 and called The only possible argument in support of a demonstration of the existence of God [Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes]. We will see that the basic notions about the concept of existence are present in a similar way in the pre-critical period, like the formulation that affirms “existence isn’t a real predicate” and “existence isn’t more than the absolute position of a thing”. We will also explain the importance of the experience for the formulation of existential judgments, affirmed both in the pre-critical work, as in the Critique of pure reason.