The problem of metaphysics as a science and the meaning of the Copernican revolution in Kant's Critique of pure reason

Abstract

Kant, in the Critique of pure reason, proposes a transformation of metaphysics into a science, inspired by physics and mathematics. Observing the failure of traditional metaphysics, which attempted to adapt knowledge to the nature of objects, Kant suggests a methodological inversion: objects must conform to knowledge, in a manner similar to the Copernican revolution, which replaced the Earth with the Sun as the center of the universe. Kant argues that the way we intuit and conceptualize the world shapes the objects we know, and although we cannot know beyond experience, we can think about it systematically through pure reason. In this context, the aim of this article is to clarify the meaning of the Copernican revolution in Kantian epistemology and metaphysics, with a focus on the analysis of paragraph 11 from the preface to the second edition of the work. With this work, I hope to contribute to the understanding of this problem, which is a classic in philosophy, especially within the context of undergraduate studies.