Substance or perceptual complex?

The question of the subject as consciousness or psychic associations

Abstract

This article discusses the authenticity of the inclusion of Sigmund Freud’s thought in the philosophy of mind. As this philosophical branch has René Descartes as one of its cardinal precursors, a parallel analysis of both thinkers is conducted. The perception of the functioning and nature of the mind is discussed, placing the concept of the subject within the thought of each of the investigated authors as one of the main foci of reflection. Subsequently, the relation between mind and body is reflected upon. It is concluded, for example, that the Cartesian notion of the subject is substantial, while the Freudian is functional, organizational, leading to the understanding that the idea is not an original expression of being, but merely an associative complex. Such conceptions place Cartesianism and Freudianism in distinct traditions of Western thought. However, this does not mean that Freud, as someone who reflected on the main questions of philosophy of mind, is not, in his own way, indebted to Cartesianism, like so many other empiricists.