The disabled existence: “being means to exist?”

Thinking about the ontological problem of truth in Gottlob Frege in inclusive education

Abstract

Being deficient implies a concept that has an identity with medical diagnosis of an injured body. Nowadays, through legal devices, the individuals diagnosed have, in possession of this identity, a legitimate means of guaranteeing the exercise of their basic rights as citizens. Thus, the task of receiving the knowledge demand produced by these identity practices that, although extralinguistic, have a linguistic dependence for the transmission of their shared meanings, by the domain of transmission and improvement of this exercise. The possession of identity by the individual, and not as property of the concept in the language of the speakers, hides the context of confrontation of the meanings that essentialized the concept of disability. The objective of this investigation will be to map what is stated in the concept of disability, reflecting such an identity demand for an inclusive education. In this sense, being deficient is a statement of how the world should be so that a deficient way of being, constantly replaceable, is included. We ask, then: "to be is to exist?". For the philosopher Gottlob Frege (1848 - 1925), to be is not to exist. In Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884), this distinction is made in the face of the ontological problem of truth.