The relation between feelings and the study of morality

Abstract

In Aristotle, pleasure can make a man commit evil acts, as the pain can stop you to perform noble deeds. Therefore, for the author, one must consider pleasure and pain by habit, so to become a virtuous man, who delights to perform noble deeds. Unlike, for Kant, an action loses its moral value if it is performed because of some inclination, i.e., whether an action was performed with pleasure, even if it is correct, it loses its moral value. In an opposite side, for Mill, morality is measured by happiness, and happiness is generated by maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. Although with different treatment for these three currents, the moral analysis is connected with moral sentiments, which we consider an error. We defend that right and wrong should be analyzed in a logical and rational way to the achievement of a specific purpose, so that the feeling generated by the action may not be able to dignify moral judgments and not be grounds for the constitution thereof.