Foundation of morality in Kant

A critique of heteronomous ethical theories

Abstract

The aim of this article is to examine how Immanuel Kant grounds morality in the autonomy of the will, as well as to demonstrate why such a grounding entails a systematic critique of heteronomous ethics. In this sense, we will show how Kantian moral philosophy brings about a decisive shift in the foundation of the moral value of action, moving it from the empirical domain to the a priori. By making explicit the limits of heteronomous ethics, whose criterion of morality rests on the effects of actions in the sensible world and on their consequences, Kant delineates the proper field of moral inquiry, establishing that moral concepts reside exclusively in reason. Thus, the foundation of moral philosophy and, consequently, of the very possibility of morality, lies solely in reason. It is within this context that the need for a metaphysics of morals arises, as developed in the Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, which presents itself under a twofold aspect: (i) to investigate the origin of practical concepts and principles a priori; and (ii) to explain how such principles and concepts can determine the human will in an unconditional manner, that is, independently of any empirical grounds.